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Preparation Paper

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

"Verification of Nuclear Non-Proliferation"

‘At a time when the threat of nuclear arms is again increasing, ...this threat must be met through the broadest possible international cooperation. This principle finds its clearest expression today in the work of the IAEA and its Director General. In the nuclear non-proliferation regime, it is the IAEA which controls that nuclear energy is not misused for military purposes,... At a time when disarmament efforts appear deadlocked, when there is a danger that nuclear arms will spread both to states and to terrorist groups, and when nuclear power again appears to be playing an increasingly significant role, this work is of incalculable importance’

Presentation Speech by Professor Ole Danbolt Mjøs, Chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, Oslo, December 10, 2005.

Source: www.nobelprize.org, retrieved on May 20th, 2006.

Distinguished Governors,
Distinguished Representatives,

We have the honour to welcome you to the Board of Governors of the IAEA, the first one in the VIMUN history.

The question of nuclear non-proliferation and the misuse of nuclear technology recently became a focus of international politics. Faced with the threat of nuclear conflict escalation, the IAEA, especially the Board of Governors, has received warm-hearted support and cheerful acknowledgement for its contribution to peace and security from the international community, which, at the same time, expects the Agency to be primarily responsible for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to strengthen its indispensable role in conflict resolution.

At the VIMUN 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors, the delegates will not only have the opportunity to experience the process of multilateral diplomacy, but also the chance to combine the information researched with the practice of negotiation skills, while representing a country's position and dealing with a highly divisive agenda.

This preparation paper is aimed at supporting each delegate in the search for relevant information, as well as at giving some insight to the conferences in the real IAEA. We hope that this paper will contribute to fruitful negotiations at the VIMUN 2006.

Let's make the IAEA Board of Governors a great success of VIMUN 2006!

Yours,

Theeraphat Trangkathumkul
Bernhard Zeilinger
Vu Thi Ha Hai

1. INTRODUCTION TO THE IAEA AND THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS

A. Continuous Efforts for Peace, Security, Safety, Development and Prosperity

The IAEA is the world´s center of cooperation in the nuclear field. It was set up as the world´s "Atoms for Peace" organization on July 29, 1957 within the United Nations family. The Agency works with its Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies.

In 1961 the IAEA opened its laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria, creating a channel for cooperative global nuclear research. As more countries mastered nuclear technology, particularly since two additional nations had "joined the club", France in 1960 and China in 1964. The safeguards prescribed in the IAEA's Statute, designed chiefly to cover individual nuclear plants or supplies of fuel, were clearly inadequate to deter proliferation. The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was therefore approved in 1968 essentially to freeze the number of declared Nuclear Weapon States at five (USA, Russia, UK, France and China). Other states are required to forswear the nuclear weapons option and to conclude comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA on their nuclear materials.

In 1986 the Chernobyl disaster dramatically underscored the need for maximum safety in nuclear operations. The Agency responded decisively by developing a strong set of international standards for nuclear safety and helping countries to meet those standards. In 1991, the discovery of Iraq's clandestine weapon programme sowed doubts about the adequacy of IAEA safeguards, but also led to steps to strengthen them, some of which were put to the test when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) became the second country that was discovered violating its NPT Safeguards Agreement. The Three Mile Island accident and especially the Chernobyl disaster persuaded governments to strengthen the IAEA's role in enhancing nuclear safety, notification of accidents and nuclear liability.

In the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War and the consequent improvement in international security virtually eliminated the danger of a global nuclear conflict. Broad adherence to regional treaties underscored the nuclear weapon free status of Latin America, Africa and South East Asia, as well as the South Pacific. The threat of proliferation in some successor states of the former Soviet Union was averted; in Iraq and the DPRK the threat was contained.

In 1995, the NPT was made permanent and in 1996 the UN General Assembly approved and opened for signature a comprehensive test ban treaty. While military nuclear activities were beyond the IAEA's statutory scope, it was now accepted that the Agency might properly deal with some of the problems bequeathed by the nuclear arms race – verification of the peaceful use or storage of nuclear material from dismantled weapons and surplus military stocks of fissile material, determining the risks posed by the nuclear wastes of nuclear warships dumped in the Arctic, and verifying the safety of former nuclear test sites in Central Asia and the Pacific. In recent years, the Agency's work has taken on some urgent added dimensions. Among them are countermeasures against the threat of nuclear terrorism, the focus of a new multi-faceted Agency action plan.

The IAEA and General Director Mohamed ElBaradei were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2005. ElBaradei said in his speech that only 1% of the money spent on developing new weapons would be enough to feed the entire world.

B. The Statute of the IAEA: Mandate and Mission

The Statute was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which was held at the Headquarters of the United Nations. It came into force on 29 July 1957.

The IAEA's mandate is to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It ensures, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its requests or under it supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose. The IAEA's mission is guided by the interests and needs of Member States, strategic plans and the vision embodied in the IAEA Statute. **There main pillars underpin the IAEA's mission: Safety and Security; Science and Technology; and Safeguards and Verification of Nuclear non-proliferation**

IAEA in the UN Family: Specialized and Special Organization

The IAEA is non-subsidiary body of the UN, and not subordinated to any UN body. Its policy-making body, the Board of Governors (BoG), the General Conference and the Secretariat enjoy a special position within the UN system having the rights to report to the UN Security Council, the ECOSOC and the General Assembly. The provision in the IAEA Statute grants a special access to the UNSC to the IAEA: Article 3/B Point 4 states that '*in carrying out its function; the Agency shall…Submit reports on its activities annually to the General Assembly of the United Nations and, when appropriate, to the Security Council: if in connection with the activities of the Agency there should arise questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall notify the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security*…', and thus political significance and high responsibility to contribute to peace and security.

In other words: should the inspection team find evidence of non-compliance with the Safeguard Agreement and/or the signed Additional Protocol by a state party and report it to the Director General, who informs the BoG, of the incidence, as the policy- and decision-making organ. The BoG shall take actions, one of these actions is notifying, reporting the opinion and suggestion of the Board to the UNSC. Moreover, according to the Paragraph C Article XII, the BoG can also suspend cooperation with that state party and take other measures to increase political pressure.

C. Policy- and Decision-Making Bodies of the IAEA

The General Conference

The General Conference is the highest policy-making body of the IAEA. It is composed of representatives of all Member States of the Agency. The General Conference meets annually, typically in September, to consider and approve the Agency´s programme and budget and to decide on other matters brought before it by the Board of Governors, the Director General, or Member States.

The General Conference elects a President and other officers as required at the beginning of each session. The General Conference, subject to the provisions of the IAEA-Statute adopts its own rules of procedure. Each member has one vote. Decisions are made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.

The Board of Governors

The Board of Governors is composed of 35 Member States, as designated and elected by the General Conference. The Board of Governors generally meets five times per year in March and June, twice in September (before and after the General Conference) and in December. At its meetings, the Board examines and makes recommendations to the General Conference on the IAEA´s accounts, programme and budget, and considers applications for membership. It also approves Safeguards Agreements and the publication of the IAEA´s safety standards and has the responsibility of appointing the Director General of the IAEA with the approval of the General Conference.

The Board of Governors elects a Chairman and other officers among its members and, subject to the provisions of the IAEA Statute, adopts its own rules of procedure. It establishes such committees as it

deems advisable. The Board of Governors prepares an annual report to the General Conference. The Board also prepares for submission to the General Conference such reports as the Agency is or maybe required to make to the United Nations or to any other organizations the work of which is related to that of the Agency. Those reports, along with the annual report are submitted to the members of the Agency at least one month before the regular annual session of the General Conference.

Each member of the Board of Governors has one vote. Decisions of the amount of the Agency's budget are made by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional questions or categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, known as a quorum.

2. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION: INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISMS

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been the primary international anti-proliferation organization since it was established in 1957 by the United Nations. It operates a safeguard system as specified under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. Other nuclear non-proliferation treaties, such as the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties in certain regions, also call for the Agency to serve in that capacity.

It has involved cooperation in developing nuclear energy while ensuring that civil uranium, plutonium, and associated plants are used only for peaceful purposes and do not contribute in any way to proliferation or nuclear weapons programmes. Nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons production technology and knowledge to nations that do not already have such capabilities. It has been opposed by many nations with and without nuclear weapons, who fear that more countries with nuclear weapons may increase the possibility of nuclear warfare, de-stabilize international or regional relations, or infringe upon the national sovereignty of individual nation-states. Other nations have pursued their own independent weapons development, calling into question the authority of some countries being able to specify who can or cannot have their own defensive nuclear weapons.

A. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is an international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS). Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. A total of 188 parties have joined the Treaty, including the five Nuclear Weapon States: the People's Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the UK, and the USA. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty's significance. Notable non-signatories to the NPT are Israel, Pakistan and India (the latter two have since tested nuclear weapons, while Israel is considered by most to be an unacknowledged Nuclear Weapons State). North Korea was once a signatory but withdrew in January 2003.

The treaty can be summarized as having three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology.

First pillar: Non-Proliferation

Five states are permitted by the NPT to own nuclear weapons: France (signed 1992), the People's Republic of China (1992), Soviet Union (1968; obligations and rights now assumed by Russia), United Kingdom (1968), and the United States (1968). These were the only states possessing such weapons at the time the treaty was opened to signature, and are also the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. These five Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) agree not to transfer nuclear

weapons or other nuclear explosive devices technology to other states, and non-NWS parties agree not to seek or develop nuclear weapons.

The five NWS parties have undertaken not to use their nuclear weapons against a non-NWS party except in response to a nuclear attack, or a conventional attack in alliance with a Nuclear Weapons State. However, these agreements have not been incorporated formally into the treaty, and the exact details have varied over time. The United States, for instance, has indicated that it may use nuclear weapons in response to a non-conventional attack by "rogue states". The previous United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, has also explicitly invoked the possibility of the use of the country's nuclear weapons in response to a non-conventional attack by "rogue states". In January 2006, Jacques Chirac of France indicated that an incident of state-sponsored terrorism on France could trigger a small-scale nuclear retaliation aimed at destroying the "rogue state's" power centres.

Second Pillar: Disarmament

Article VI and the preamble indicate that the NWS parties pursue plans to reduce and liquidate their stockpiles; Article VI also calls for "... a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." In Article I, the Nuclear Weapon States declare not to "induce any non-Nuclear Weapon State to ... acquire nuclear weapons." A pre-emptive-strike doctrine and otherwise threatening postures can be viewed as induction by non-NWS parties.

Third Pillar: the Right to Peacefully Use Nuclear Technology

Most countries around the world use nuclear technologies for a wide variety of peaceful purposes – for generating electricity, diagnosing disease and treating cancer, for numerous industrial applications and for food and medical sterilization. Since very few of the Nuclear Weapons States and states using nuclear reactions for energy generation are willing to completely abandon possession of nuclear fuel, the third pillar of the NPT provides other states with the possibility to do the same, but under conditions intended to make it difficult to develop nuclear weapons. At least 30 countries have nuclear power reactors. There are scores of other major facilities containing nuclear material in over 70 countries that are “safeguarded” under IAEA agreements with governments.

For some states, this third pillar of the NPT, which allows uranium enrichment for fuel reasons, seems to be a major loophole. However, the treaty gives every state the inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and as the commercially popular light water reactor nuclear power station designs use enriched uranium fuel, it follows that states must be allowed to enrich uranium or purchase it on an international market. Peaceful uranium enrichment can arguably be considered a small step away from developing nuclear warheads, and this can be done by withdrawing from the NPT. No state is known to have successfully constructed a nuclear weapon in secret while subjected to NPT inspection.

B. Safeguard System

Safeguards are set of activities by which the IAEA seeks to verify that a state is living up to its international undertakings not to use nuclear programmes for nuclear weapons purposes. The safeguard system is based on assessment of the correctness and completeness of the state’s declaration to the IAEA concerning nuclear material and nuclear-related activities. To date, 145 states have entered into such agreements with the IAEA, submitting nuclear materials, facilities and activities to the scrutiny of IAEA´s safeguards inspectors. In recognition of this, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) makes it mandatory for all non-Nuclear Weapon States (non-NWS) parties to conclude comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA, and thus put all of their nuclear material under safeguards. Article III of the NPT provides that all non-NWS must *“accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under [the NPT]…”.* Such negotiations are to be initiated no later than on the day that the state deposits its instrument of ratification to the NPT, and concluded within 18 months.

The basic features of the Agency´s traditional safeguard system are:

- *Nuclear material accounting*, through which, on the basis of information provided primarily by the state, the Agency establishes an initial inventory of nuclear material in the state, and records subsequent changes to it;

- *Containment and surveillance measures* to monitor access to and movement of nuclear material;

- *On-site inspections and visits* during which Agency inspectors have the right to carry out a variety of measures for the purpose of verifying the correctness and completeness of states' declarations concerning nuclear materials accountancy and their nuclear programmes.

In the context of the NPT, the IAEA is thus charged with providing the international community with credible assurance that any nuclear material in peaceful use is not being diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This task can only be realized in states that have concluded Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. Moreover, for the Agency to ensure the absence of possible undeclared material and activities, states should have in force an Additional Protocol to their Safeguards Agreements, based on the model approved in 1997.

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs)

All non-NWS party to the NPT, as well as states party to the regional nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, are required to conclude CSAs with the Agency. In accordance with the terms of such agreements, a state undertakes to accept safeguards on all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities, within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere for the purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Under these agreements, the Agency has the right and obligation to ensure that safeguards are applied on all such nuclear material.

Some measures under Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements:

- IAEA collection of environmental samples in facilities and at locations where inspectors have access during inspections and design information visits (with sample analysis at the IAEA Clean Laboratory and/or at certified laboratories in Member States).

- IAEA expanded use of unannounced inspections within the scheduled routine inspection regime.

- IAEA enhanced evaluation of information from a state's declarations, IAEA verification activities and a wide range of open sources.

- State provision of design information on new facilities or on changes in existing facilities handling safeguarded nuclear material as soon as the state authorities decide to construct, authorize construction or modify a facility. The IAEA has the continuing right to verify the design information over the facility's lifecycle, including decommissioning.

- State *voluntary* reporting on imports and exports of nuclear material and exports of specified equipment and non-nuclear material. (Components of this reporting are incorporated in the Model Additional Protocol).

- Closer co-operation between the IAEA and the state (and regional) systems for accounting for and control of nuclear material in Member States.

Voluntary Offer Agreements (VOAs)

The five NPT Nuclear Weapon States have concluded Safeguards Agreements covering some or all of their peaceful nuclear activities. Under the VOAs, facilities or nuclear material in facilities noticed to the Agency by the state concerned are offered for the application of safeguards. VOAs serve two

purposes: to broaden the Agency's safeguards experience by allowing for inspections at advanced facilities; and to demonstrate that Nuclear Weapon States are not commercially advantaged by being exempt from safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities.

Item-Specific Safeguards Agreements

Agreements in this category cover only specialised material, facilities and other items placed under safeguards, and are based on the safeguards procedures approved by the Board of Governors. States parties to such agreements undertake not to use the material, facilities and/or other items under safeguards in such a way as to further any military purpose. The Agency implements such agreements in the three states that are not party to the NPT.

Additional Protocols (APs)

These were designed for states having a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency, in order to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system as a contribution to global non-proliferation objectives. Under an Additional Protocol, which is the key to the strengthened safeguards system, a state is required to provide the IAEA with broader information covering all aspects of its nuclear fuel cycle-related activities, including research and development and uranium mining. States must also grant the Agency broader access rights and enable it to use the most advanced verification technologies.

Some measures under Additional Protocols:

- The IAEA is to be given considerably more information on nuclear and nuclear-related activities, including R&D, production of uranium and thorium (regardless of whether it is traded), and nuclear-related imports and exports.

- IAEA inspectors will have greater rights of access. This will include any suspect location, it can be at short notice (e.g. two hours), and the IAEA can deploy environmental sampling and remote monitoring techniques to detect illicit activities.

- IAEA right to make use of internationally established communications systems, including satellite systems and other forms of telecommunication.

Currently 54 states have signed and 18 have ratified the Additional Protocol.

C. Safeguards Implementation

All non-NWS parties to the NPT are required under international law to bring into force a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. Moreover, only through the widest possible adherence to the strengthened safeguards system based on Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols will the full potential of the IAEA safeguards system be realized.

For all states with Safeguards Agreements, the Agency draws an annual conclusion on the non-diversion of nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards. For states with Additional Protocols, the Agency aims to provide more comprehensive assurances regarding not only non-diversion of nuclear material placed under safeguards, but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities. Such assurances are based on the Agency's evaluations, taking into account all information on a state available to it, including analyses of samples collected in nuclear or nuclear-related facilities during complementary access.

When provided with the necessary authority, access and information, the Agency is able to draw the conclusion that all nuclear material in the state remained in peaceful nuclear activities. For the Agency to draw such conclusion credibly, both a CSA and an AP must be in force or otherwise applied for that

state, and the Agency must have been able to conduct all necessary verification and evaluation activities under those agreements. For states that have CSAs in force and no APs, the Agency does not have sufficient means to draw such conclusion credibly, and therefore generally only draws the conclusion that all declared nuclear material remained in peaceful nuclear activities.

Verification Measures

Safeguards are based on assessments of the correctness and completeness of a state's declared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities. Verification measures include on-site inspections, visits, and ongoing monitoring and evaluation. Basically, two sets of measures are carried out in accordance with the type of Safeguards Agreements in force with a state.

- One set relates to verifying state reports of declared nuclear material and activities. These measures – authorized under NPT-type Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements – largely are based on nuclear material accountancy, complemented by containment and surveillance techniques, such as tamper-proof seals and cameras that the IAEA installs at facilities.

- Another set adds measures to strengthen the IAEA's inspection capabilities by an " Additional Protocol". The measures enable the IAEA not only to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material but also to provide assurances as to the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a state.

Inspections

Under NPT Safeguards Agreements, the purpose of inspection activities is to verify information on reported nuclear material. They are therefore generally focused on declared nuclear facilities containing nuclear material. Consequently, on-site inspections are generally very limited or non-existent in SQP States ("Small Quantities States" means: state with little or no nuclear material and/or nuclear activities). Regarding the Additional protocol, the Agency's governing bodies have underlined that it should be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner and that implementation should be neither mechanistic nor systematic. Guided by such principles, complementary access by IAEA inspectors may be carried out in all states with Additional Protocols in force. It is foreseen that the measures in the Model Additional Protocol will enable safeguards to be implemented more effectively and allow the Agency's resources to be used more efficiently. The inspections act as an alert system providing a warning of the possible diversion of nuclear material from peaceful activities.

Different types of on-site inspections and visits under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements:

- *Ad hoc* inspections typically are made to verify a state's initial report of nuclear material or reports on changes thereto, and to verify the nuclear material involved in international transfers.

- *Routine inspections* – the type most frequently used – may be carried out according to a defined schedule or they may be of an unannounced, short-notice character.

- *Special inspections* may be carried out in unusual circumstances according to defined procedures. The IAEA may carry out such inspections if it considers that information made available by the state concerned, including explanations from the state and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under the Safeguards Agreement.

- *Safeguards visits* may be made to declared facilities at appropriate times during the lifecycle for verifying the safeguards relevant design information.

D. Fulfilment of International Obligations

All NPT non-weapons states must accept these full-scope safeguards. In the five weapons states plus the non-NPT states (India, Pakistan and Israel), facility-specific safeguards apply. IAEA inspectors

regularly visit these facilities to verify completeness and accuracy of records. The terms of the NPT cannot be enforced by the IAEA itself, nor can nations be forced to sign the treaty. In reality, as shown in Iraq and North Korea, safeguards can be backed up by diplomatic, political and economic measures. While traditional safeguards easily verified the correctness of formal declarations by suspect states, in the 1990s attention turned to what might not have been declared. While accepting safeguards at declared facilities, Iraq had set up elaborate equipment elsewhere in an attempt to enrich uranium to weapons grade. North Korea attempted to use research reactors (not commercial electricity-generating reactors) and a reprocessing plant to produce some weapons grade plutonium.

The weakness of the NPT regime lays in the fact that no obvious diversion of material was involved. The uranium used as fuel probably came from indigenous sources, and the nuclear facilities were built by the countries themselves without being declared or placed under safeguards. Iraq, as an NPT party, was obliged to declare all facilities but did not do so. Nevertheless, the activities were detected and brought under control using international diplomacy. In Iraq, a military defeat assisted this process. The greatest risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, however, lies with countries which have not joined the NPT and which have significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities. India, Pakistan and Israel are in this category. While safeguards apply to some of their activities, others remain beyond scrutiny.

3. OUR AGENDA: VERIFICATION OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

Among all interesting agendas of each BoG meeting, we decided to choose the agenda 'Verification of Nuclear Non-Proliferation' to be our agenda. Verification of nuclear non-proliferation is not only one of the main missions of the IAEA, but also very highly political, and therefore consumes most of the BoG meeting time. The variation of the issues dealt with within the agenda reflects the geographical variation of 'hot spots', where incompliance with the non-proliferation regime is suspected.

Since the BoG meeting in September 2004, three issues closely and politically relating to the IAEA nuclear non-proliferation regime have always been on the agenda: the implementation of nuclear non-proliferation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Implementation of Safeguards Agreement in the Middle East and the DPRK nuclear issue, the three issues we are to discuss at VIMUN 2006. The delegates will have to adopt the agenda and decide upon the order of these three issues. Due to the fact that they all have a conflictual character and that there have been diplomatic negotiations to solve these conflicts outside the UN system, whose outcome and the result of the multilateral negotiations in the BoG substantially influence each other, we would like to suggest the delegates to give attention to the order of the issues and consider the time limit. The delegates should be also aware that some dynamics might emerge during the negotiations, aimed at approaching the reality at the IAEA BoG meetings.

As the nuclear non-proliferation issues touch upon the security interest of every Board Member, the decision-making process within the Board has been characterized by the so-called 'Vienna Consensus'. It has been a practice of the BoG to reach consensus on every issue, in order to emphasize the common willingness and commitment and give the resolutions an immense political importance. The Vienna Consensus is regarded as helping the IAEA maintain its political authority.

A. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

The issue of the Iranian nuclear programme and the role of the IAEA Board of Governors in this matter have been frequently and circumstantially reported, so that the international community has become well-informed of its development and of different diplomatic conflict de-escalation efforts by international community and the UN, especially the IAEA. The attempt to mediate between the conflicting Board members by some countries has been closely regarded by all the BoG members in order to elaborate further development and to determine the position in the next board meeting.

Iran as a state party to the NPT has concluded the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA but refused to sign the Additional Protocol legally bringing about the additional obligation concerning the verification of non-proliferation. Instead of this, as a confidence-building measure, Iran claims to have

been acting as if the Additional Protocol signed in 2003 were in force. In 2002, the Iranian government agreed to increase the transparency of its nuclear programme by improving cooperation with the IAEA. Nevertheless, the verification issue has remained the key challenge to the IAEA mission. Afterwards, Iran gradually reduced the scale of what had been regarded as voluntary confidence-building measures, including the suspension of uranium conversion activities. Consequently, the BoG passed the resolution when the first indirect reference to the Security Council took place in September 2005, pointing out non-compliance with the IAEA status and the objectives and purpose of the Additional Protocol Iran had signed. On the other side, Iran, stressing its inalienable rights of the peaceful and civil use of the nuclear energy, resumed enrichment and Nuclear R&D activities in January 2006.

The resolution passed in February 2006 was a result of deeply contradictory opinions: some governors emphasized the Iranian claim to peaceful use of nuclear power and Iran's hitherto voluntary compliance with the Additional Protocol, whereas the EU3 and other like-minded emphasized the record of concealment, several provocative actions, deception in Iran's confidence-building measures and their disbelief in Iranian willingness to negotiate. On February 4th, 2006, the BoG agreed to remain seized of this matter while referring this issue to the Security Council, which will probably in due course take action. According to the Director General, the Security Council will 'lend its weight to the IAEA´s efforts so as to make sure Iran will work as closely as possible, and deliberate on the global political picture', whereas the IAEA will continue to urge inspections and ask Iran to be as transparent as possible.

B. Implementation of Safeguards in the DPRK

Very little is known about the recent economic and political development of North Korea. The North East Asian country's military potential and weaponry are also an important factors of further development of the security and political stability (even equilibrium). Although, the beginning of an economic opening-up has been recently observed, North Korea is far from being prepared to increase its transparency and to clarify several important issues relating to transnational crime, human and drugs trafficking, illegal weapons transfer, as well as its concealed nuclear activities.

After the DPRK's ascension to the NPT in 1985, the IAEA has never been able to verify full compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement by the DPRK, because suspicious activities took place before its conclusion, the Agency thus never had a complete picture of the DPRK's nuclear activities, nor could it assure the international community of the peaceful character of its nuclear programme. In 2002, following a visit by the IAEA in certain nuclear facilities and the appearance of new information on the possibility of concealment of unsafeguarded facilities, doubt as to the peaceful nature of the nuclear programme was raised and the BoG urged the DPRK to facilitate cooperation with the Agency, whereas the UN Security Council also expressed its deep concern over possible escalation. The DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT in April 2003 and its declaration that it had nuclear weapons increased further doubt in the DPRK's peaceful intention. The BoG subsequently referred the withdrawal to the Security Council, stressing its commitment to clarify the DPRK nuclear issue. The Director General in his report updated the Board and the General Conference about the development of the issue. Although the DPRK has resigned from the IAEA, the issue is highly relevant to the Board and the IAEA, who consistently have expressed willingness and preparedness to resume their tasks as soon as the necessary legal and political authority exist. The IAEA is aware that this issue, like other non-proliferation issues, is an indicator of the Agency's effectiveness, and therefore many members might suggest that all Board political competence should be exhausted in the resolution of this problem.

The Six-Party Talks initiated in 2003 have been closely and enthusiastically observed by the Board members. At the Six-Party Talks in September 2005, the DPRK declared its intention to suspend and abandon all nuclear weapons and nuclear programs without giving a specific date. Although no concrete result had been announced over the return to the NPT and the IAEA safeguards and several political and technical points remained to be elaborated, the BoG members articulated their supportive opinion towards the talks.

C. Implementation of the Safeguards Agreement in the Middle East

The Middle East has been a region of political instability for decades. Many political factors have caused a deep sense of insecurity to spread: ranging from the Arab-Israeli conflict and the lack of nuclear transparency in Iran or Libya to the political uncertainty in Iraq. Consequently, several countries in the region have refused to legally and effectively ban nuclear weapons without a prior comprehensive peace settlement. While Israel rejects the NPT, reflecting the sense of insecurity, the overwhelming majority of people in Arabic countries support the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Again without a comprehensive and widely respected arrangement on the issues of weapon of mass destruction, distrust and security threats hamper confidence building and the possibilities of a peaceful conflict settlement.

The IAEA understands itself to be an organization that contributes to the comprehensive Middle East peace process, especially in the realization of the nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, an objective agreed upon by Israel and other Arabic countries and set by UN General Assembly resolution 3262, 30 years ago. An indispensable and essential component of such a NWFZ is the full-scale implementation of IAEA safeguards by all countries in the region, which would guarantee the highest possible transparency through the implementation of unannounced inspections anytime and anywhere. The BoG has been taking steps to support the establishment of an IAEA system of verification in the region and universal acceptance of instruments concerning nuclear non-proliferation, while considering the possibility of a regional-specific and item-specific Safeguards Agreement, that invites countries to adhere to the relevant instruments and authorizes the IAEA to continue consultation with them on the possibility of Safeguards implementation.

Even though the geographical scope of the Middle East NWFZ has not been fixed and the project remains far from realisation, the IAEA substantially contributes the promotion of mutual confidence in every possible occasion resulting from changes in regional politics. The IAEA has been active in Libya since December 2003, after the Libyan authority agreed to abandon its nuclear programme and to correct its failure to comply with international standards. The changing picture of Middle East regional politics could gradually open to the Agency the possibility of implementing the Safeguard Agreement. Currently, the Agency also strengthens the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the region, coordinates intra-regional technical cooperation and actively assists in combating nuclear terrorism which could destabilize the region.

D. Other Remarks

- In order to be well prepared for the conference, we might suggest that the delegates should also take into account the actions taken by other related UN organs, as well as all ongoing negotiations outside the UN family. It is very advisable to pay close attention to reports by the Director General prior to the opening of each Board meeting.

- Like all other VIMUN 2006 committees, a resolution can be passed only with the approval of at least two-third majority of the Board. This implies the need to form an alliance of like-minded board members. However, such an inflexible alliance might inevitably lead to confrontation and breaking the unwritten principle of Vienna Consensus.

- Although the Board is not officially divided in clear country groupings, whose position is presented only by the group representatives, it must be noted that there exist several unofficial group consultations. The result of such consultations is usually made public by a few key countries in the group. This neither prevents all other members from expressing their opinion nor from initiating proposals, nor limit any rights. In fact, most of the members attend the group meeting(s) in order to receive important information depending on the instructions.

- Three important groupings should be mentioned here: The Non-Aligned Movement, the EU countries, the G77 and China. The delegates could try to determine the positions of the representative countries in each group during the period the VIMUN 2006 takes place.

- Those countries participating as observers also have a highly significant role to play, especially when their interests are touched upon in certain issues.

E. Status of Important Relevant Legal Documents

	IAEA Member	VIMUN06 BoG*	NPT party	Safeguards Agreement concluded with IAEA**	Additional Protocol***
Afghanistan	x		x	x	x
Albania	x		x	x	o
Algeria	x	x	x	x	
Angola	x		x	o	
Andorra			x	o	o
Argentina	x	x	x	x	x
Armenia	x		x	x	x
Australia	x	x	x	x	x
Austria	x		x	x	x
Azerbaijan	x		x	x	x
Bahamas			x	x	
Bahrain			x	o	
Bangladesh	x		x	x	x
Barbados			x	x	
Belarus	x	x	x	x	o
Belgium	x	x	x	x	x
Benin	x		x	o	o
Bhutan			x	x	
Bolivia	x		x	x	
Bosnia/Herzegovina	x		x	x	
Botswana	x		x	o	
Brazil	x	x	x	x	x
Brunei			x	x	
Bulgaria	x		x	x	x
Burkina Faso	x		x	x	x
Burundi			x	o	
Cambodia			x	x	
Cameroon	x		x	x	o
Canada	x	x	x	x	x
Cape Verde			x	o	o
Central African Rep.			x	o	
Chad	x		x	o	
Chile	x		x	x	x
China	x	x	x	VOA	x
Comoros			x	o	o
Costa Rica	x		x	x	o
Colombia	x	x	x	x	o
Croatia	x		x	x	x
Cuba	x	x	x	x	x
Cyprus	x		x	x	x
Czech Republic	x		x	x	x
Dem.Rep.Congo	x		x	x	x
Republic of Congo			x	o	

	IAEA Member	VIMUN06 BoG*	NPT party	Safeguards Agreement concluded with IAEA**	Additional Protocol***
Dominica			x	x	
Dominican Republic	x		x	x	
Ecuador	x	x	x	x	x
Egypt	x		x	x	
El Salvador	x		x	x	x
Equitorial Guinea			x	o	
Estonia	x		x	x	x
Eritrea	x		x	o	
Ethiopia	x		x	x	
Fiji			x	x	
Finland	x	O	x	x	x
France	x	x	x	VOA	x
FYROM	x		x	x	o
Gabon			x	o	o
Gambia			x	x	
Georgia	x		x	x	x
Germany	x	x	x	x	x
Ghana	x	x	x	x	x
Grenada			x	x	
Greece	x	x	x	x	x
Guatemala	x		x	x	o
Guinea			x	o	
Guinea-Bissau			x	x	
Guyana			x	x	
Haiti	x		x	x	x
Holy See	x		x	x	x
Honduras	x		x	x	o
Hungary	x		x	x	x
Iceland	x		x	x	x
Indonesia	x	x	x	x	x
India	x	x			
Iran	x	O	x	x	o
Ireland	x		x	x	x
Israel	x	O			
Italy	x		x	x	x
Jamaica	x		x	x	x
Japan	x	C	x	x	x
Jordan	x		x	x	x
Kazakhstan	x		x	x	o
Kenya	x		x	o	
Kiribati			x	x	o
Kuwait	x		x	x	x
Kyrgyzstan	x		x	x	

	IAEA Member	VIMUN06 BoG*	NPT party	Safeguards Agreement concluded with IAEA**	Additional Protocol***
Cote d'Ivoire			x	x	
Denmark	x		x	x	x
Djibuti			x	o	
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	x	x	x	x	o
Liechtenstein	x		x	x	
Lithuania	x		x	x	x
Luxembourg	x		x	x	x
Madagascar	x		x	x	x
Malawi			x	x	
Malaysia	x	O	x	x	o
Maldives			x	x	
Mali	x		x	x	x
Malta	x		x	x	x
Marshall Islands	x		x	x	x
Mauritania	x		x	o	o
Mauritius	x		x	x	o
Mexico	x		x	x	o
Micronesia			x	o	
Moldova	x		x	o	
Monaco	x		x	x	x
Mongolia	x		x	x	x
Morocco	x		x	x	o
Myanmar	x		x	x	
Namibia	x		x	x	o
Nepal			x	x	
Netherlands	x		x	x	x
New Zealand	x		x	x	x
Nicaragua	x		x	x	x
Niger	x		x	x	o
Nigeria	x		x	x	o
Norway	x	x	x	x	
Oman			x	o	
Pakistan	x	O			x
Palau			x	x	x
Panama	x		x	x	x
Palau			x	x	
Paraguay	x		x	x	x
Peru	x		x	x	x
Philippines	x		x	x	o
Poland	x		x	x	x
Portugal	x	x	x	x	x
Qatar	x		x	o	
Republic of Korea	x	x	x	x	x
Romania	x		x	x	x
Russian Federation	x	x	x	VOA	o
Rwanda			x	o	
Saudi Arabia	x		x	o	
Senegal	x		x	x	
Serbia/Montenegro	x		x	x	
Latvia	x		x	x	x
Lebanon	x		x	x	
Liberia	x		x	o	
Seychelles	x		x	x	x
Sierra Leon	x		x	o	
Singapore	x	x	x	x	o
Slovakia	x	CC	x	x	x
Slovenia	x	x	x	x	x
South Africa	x	x	x	x	x
Spain	x		x	x	x
Sri Lanka	x	x	x	x	x
Sudan	x		x	x	
Sweden	x	x	x	x	x
Switzerland	x		x	x	x
Syria	x	x	x	x	
Tajikistan	x		x	x	x
Tanzania	x		x	x	x
Thailand	x		x	x	o
Timor l'Este			x	o	
Togo			x	o	o
Tunisia	x		x	x	o
Turkey	x		x	x	x
Turkmenistan			x	x	x
Uganda	x		x	x	x
Ukraine	x		x	x	x
UAE	x		x	x	
UK	x	x	x	VOA	x
USA	x	x	x	VOA	o
Uruguay	x		x	x	x
Uzbekistan	x		x	x	x
Venezuela	x	x	x	x	x
Vietnam	x		x	x	
Yemen	x	x	x	x	
Zambia	x		x	x	
Zimbabwe	x		x	x	

* O for Observer, C for Chair and CC for Co-Chair

** x for the Safeguards Agreement in force

o for the Agreement approved by the Board but not yet signed or signed but not in force, and for the countries that have not submitted the Agreement to the Board

VOA for Voluntary Offer Agreements

*** x for the Additional Protocols in force

o for Additional Protocol signed but not yet in force

As of June 14th, 2006.

4. SOURCES AND LINKS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA):
http://www.iaea.org/

The IAEA Statute
http://www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html

Lists of Relevant Treaties and Agreements
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/legal.html

The NPT
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/Npt/index.shtml

Additional Protocol
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html

Safeguards Agreement
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html

UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC):
http://www.un.org/Depts/ddar/discomm/undc.html

UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR):
http://www.unidir.org/html/en/home.html

The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy:
http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/index.htm

Arms Control Association:
http://www.armscontrol.org/

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/treaties.cfm

Monterey Institute of International Studies:
http://cns.miis.edu/

British American Security Information Council:
http://www.basicint.org/

‘Imagine a world where we would settle our differences through diplomacy and dialogue and not through bombs or bullets. Imagine if the only nuclear weapons remaining were the relics in our museums. Imagine the legacy we could leave to our children.

Imagine that such a world is within our grasp.’

The Nobel Lecture by Mohamed ElBaradei

Nobel Lecture, Oslo, December 10, 2005.

Source: www.nobelprize.org, retrieved on May 20th, 2006.